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24

The Monero Research Lab is a team of voluntary researchers, scientists and academics that did analyse Monero and its predecessor CryptoNote in the past, explaining both past attacks and possible privacy issues in the current network. Their research is mostly funded by donations from the Monero community and is publicly available. In the following segment I ...


17

First, there is no stealing possible, so your funds are safe ASSUMING THE MONEROV (OR OTHER KEY REUSING FORK) SOFTWARE IS NOT A TROJAN. If it is not, then the key reuse only affects one of the privacy layers Monero offers, and does not allow either double spending nor stealing. Of course, since monerov is currently closed source, it may be that the binaries ...


15

MoneroV is a chain split off Monero. It will inherit Monero's history going forward. MoneroV is widely regarded as an attack on the Monero network. Any initial transactions made on MoneroV will be directly linked to their Monero counterpart. For instance, suppose I have money in Monero address A at the time of the chain split. I then spend my MoneroV and ...


9

MoneroV despite whatever intentions it may claim is an actual attack on MoneroV's own privacy as well as Monero's and even in MoneroV's claims of basic differences highlights several red flags that make MoneroV indistinguishable from a scam. I say it is a definite attack and not subjective because it does undermine RingCT (explained below) even if that's not ...


9

Let's start with the original question, which is making some false assumptions. Riccardo Spagni answered around 80%, which is a lot and an entity like IRS would not be able to get that many keys from actual users. It's important to clarify 80% of what exactly, as we'll see below. But what about generating millions of accounts every hour to keep having ...


9

Monero makes no attempt to encrypt or obfuscate the data being sent between peers. A passive attacker could monitor the transactions in the same manner to identify the IP that originated a particular transaction. Unlike Bitcoin, Monero transactions always use ring signatures and always mask recipient addresses (I don't remember if the latter is enforced by ...


8

This is not a protocol level issue, but a network one: someone monitoring the network can still connect transactions and the IP addresses of the nodes that first broadcasted them; and if you just run Monero's client out of the box there is no built-in protection against that! Possible solutions Run your full node through TORSOCKS following the instructions ...


7

This is information in supplement to user36303's comment. I've created a high-level guide below on how to handle chain splits. Many of the actions can be taken with the steps listed in the other comment. Keep in mind that even if you do make transactions without claiming a chain split, you should commit to it. If you have even the slightest desire to claim ...


5

I2P's threat model consists of : Brute force attacks A brute force attack can be mounted by a global passive or active adversary, watching all the messages pass between all of the nodes and attempting to correlate which message follows which path Timing attacks I2P's messages are unidirectional and do not necessarily imply that a reply will be sent. ...


5

1) The blockchain can fork at any time. From what I've observed, it only gets as far as 1-2 blocks down a branch before a chain reorganization occurs and the canonical longest branch is restored. Meanwhile, as noted here Why does Monero prevent transactions from being spent without 10 confirmations? it takes 10 blocks before any output is spendable. I ...


4

An output's public key uniquely identifies an output [1]. A ring signature takes N outputs, one of them being the one that's actually spent, and makes a signature that can be verified, such that: one of the outputs in this ring is spent all the outputs in this ring have equal probability of being the one being spent Now, the scenario in MRL-0004 is more ...


3

The "paper" you cite is full of inaccuracies and has been debunked, at length in other channels, such as this reddit thread. That should be the end of it. What is it exactly and how can one execute it? The general, and flawed, presumption is that an attacker can flood the network with cheap transactions. The aim of which being to track other users ...


3

This is somewhat related to the Temporal Associations, described in MRL4 here, and temporal alignment, described in this SE question. To specifically answer your questions: However, if UserA broadcasts that TX at 8:00PM, is there any record of that? The broadcast of the transaction isn't stored in the blockchain, but its time of inclusion into the ...


3

It's the same as in Bitcoin. You have to connect to a large amount of nodes, and see which node you first heat about that tx first. Then this node is either the originator, or "closer" to the originator than the ohter nodes you're connected to. "closer" here means closer in relay time, wihch depends on internet connection speeds, etc.


2

I'm guessing this refers to the "mass social engineering" attack where people are "paid" to use their Monero keys against the network. If you can get enough people to "de-anonymize" their transactions, the remaining anonymity pool decreases. It works like this: someone forks monero, and sets their starting chain to be a copy of the existing monero chain ...


2

Pending transactions are in a transaction pool, which is publicly available. See for example this page. Each daemon has a copy of that transaction pool and, when finding a block, will include some of the transactions in the block before pushing it to the network. The details of the transaction, (a) as created by a wallet client, (b) in the transaction pool ...


1

A blackball list is a set of outputs which are known to be spent - or so the claim is. As you surmise, if that list lists outputs which are not known to be spent, but does not list outputs which are known to be spent, this will indeed cause the wallet to use a weaker ring. If you do not want to scan the blockchains yourself, a way to mitigate this is to ge ...


1

Your wallet password is local to the wallet. It's not sent to the daemon, which never gets hold of that, nor the wallet keys. Using Tor, information is encrypted between your own tor daemon (though if you're going to use a third party Monero daemon, you might be using a third party Tor daemon, which is even worse) and the destination hidden service, so any ...


1

I went to #monero Slack channel, and received these answers: pigeons: … the destinations that the client sees are "encrypted" and not linkable to the monero receiving address you use endogenic: … the daemon would only see signed transactions, not the info and only someone with the view key could see what's in there fluffypony: correct, the daemon ...


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