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25 votes
Accepted

What privacy issues did Monero have and still has?

The Monero Research Lab is a team of voluntary researchers, scientists and academics that did analyse Monero and its predecessor CryptoNote in the past, explaining both past attacks and possible ...
James Cameron's user avatar
17 votes
Accepted

How can individuals safeguard themselves and the community against a key reusing fork?

First, there is no stealing possible, so your funds are safe ASSUMING THE MONEROV (OR OTHER KEY REUSING FORK) SOFTWARE IS NOT A TROJAN. If it is not, then the key reuse only affects one of the privacy ...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
15 votes

What is MoneroV, and how is it different than Monero?

MoneroV is a chain split off Monero. It will inherit Monero's history going forward. MoneroV is widely regarded as an attack on the Monero network. Any initial transactions made on MoneroV will be ...
sgp's user avatar
  • 8,806
9 votes
Accepted

What is MoneroV, and how is it different than Monero?

MoneroV despite whatever intentions it may claim is an actual attack on MoneroV's own privacy as well as Monero's and even in MoneroV's claims of basic differences highlights several red flags that ...
xmrscott's user avatar
  • 106
9 votes
Accepted

How can Monero defend against a "majority of view keys" attack?

Let's start with the original question, which is making some false assumptions. Riccardo Spagni answered around 80%, which is a lot and an entity like IRS would not be able to get that many keys ...
JollyMort's user avatar
  • 19.9k
9 votes
Accepted

Monero wallet packet sniffing

Monero makes no attempt to encrypt or obfuscate the data being sent between peers. A passive attacker could monitor the transactions in the same manner to identify the IP that originated a particular ...
Lee Clagett's user avatar
8 votes

What privacy issues did Monero have and still has?

This is not a protocol level issue, but a network one: someone monitoring the network can still connect transactions and the IP addresses of the nodes that first broadcasted them; and if you just run ...
user141's user avatar
  • 3,327
7 votes

How can individuals safeguard themselves and the community against a key reusing fork?

This is information in supplement to user36303's comment. I've created a high-level guide below on how to handle chain splits. Many of the actions can be taken with the steps listed in the other ...
sgp's user avatar
  • 8,806
6 votes

Replay attacks and address differentiation after a hard fork?

1) The blockchain can fork at any time. From what I've observed, it only gets as far as 1-2 blocks down a branch before a chain reorganization occurs and the canonical longest branch is restored. ...
hyc's user avatar
  • 4,233
5 votes

What are the threats against I2P?

I2P's threat model consists of : Brute force attacks A brute force attack can be mounted by a global passive or active adversary, watching all the messages pass between all of the nodes and ...
Moroccan Engineer's user avatar
4 votes
Accepted

Is it possible to trace an output in the Monero blockchain?

An output's public key uniquely identifies an output [1]. A ring signature takes N outputs, one of them being the one that's actually spent, and makes a signature that can be verified, such that: one ...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
3 votes
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What is Monero's FloodXMR attack published in 2019 May and how can it be executed or defeated?

The "paper" you cite is full of inaccuracies and has been debunked, at length in other channels, such as this reddit thread. That should be the end of it. What is it exactly and how can one ...
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
3 votes

How was the official Monero website hacked to deliver malware at the end of 2019?

It was the server hosting the binaries that was compromised during this attack. Luckily signed files with the genuine binary hashes were available on other sources and servers, so the attack was ...
TheCharlatan's user avatar
3 votes

Can an ISP swap out Monero's default peers? Would this be detectable?

Since those peers are hardcoded into the Monero software, could a malicious ISP intercept initial communications by redirecting traffic to those peers? Sure, to another valid Monero node. Traffic ...
Bill McGonigle's user avatar
3 votes

Does Monero protect against timing analysis?

This is somewhat related to the Temporal Associations, described in MRL4 here, and temporal alignment, described in this SE question. To specifically answer your questions: However, if UserA ...
Ginger Ale's user avatar
  • 5,676
3 votes
Accepted

How hard is it to find the originating IP of a monero transaction (pre Kovri)?

It's the same as in Bitcoin. You have to connect to a large amount of nodes, and see which node you first heat about that tx first. Then this node is either the originator, or "closer" to the ...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
2 votes
Accepted

What is an airdrop attack?

I'm guessing this refers to the "mass social engineering" attack where people are "paid" to use their Monero keys against the network. If you can get enough people to "de-anonymize" their transactions,...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
2 votes

Does the daemon that mines a block see the transactions in clear text?

Pending transactions are in a transaction pool, which is publicly available. See for example this page. Each daemon has a copy of that transaction pool and, when finding a block, will include some of ...
assylias's user avatar
  • 2,208
2 votes

Can an ISP swap out Monero's default peers? Would this be detectable?

You are referring to seed nodes. These are the set of hardcoded peers a fresh user will first request other peers from and is a common problem for all P2P networks - how to discover other peers on ...
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
2 votes
Accepted

Solutions to the Monero EABE attack?

...since this was posted in 2017 Well, apart from a host of other changes since 2017, specific changes that have helped mitigate the risks of an EABE attack are ring size increases and selection ...
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
2 votes

If enough sub-addresses under a single seed are known, can that seed be reverse-engineered?

If enough sub-addresses under a single seed are known, can that seed be reverse-engineered? No.
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
1 vote

Can a change output be sent to the same destination without them knowing it come from a transaction they received in the past?

If I send them the change output of a transaction they received from me, wouldn't they assume that it was that, a change output, and have good heuristic that tells them how much money the original ...
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
1 vote

What sort of deanonimization attack could someone controlling the majority of nodes pull off?

In the era of Docker containers and how easy it is to spin up potentially thousands of nodes in a minute, I wouldn't agree it's as easy as you allude to. Each node needs to use a blockchain (storage) ...
jtgrassie's user avatar
  • 19.2k
1 vote
Accepted

Could a blackballs list be used maliciously?

A blackball list is a set of outputs which are known to be spent - or so the claim is. As you surmise, if that list lists outputs which are not known to be spent, but does not list outputs which are ...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
1 vote

Is the connection over Tor between client and remote node safe?

Your wallet password is local to the wallet. It's not sent to the daemon, which never gets hold of that, nor the wallet keys. Using Tor, information is encrypted between your own tor daemon (though if ...
user36303's user avatar
  • 34.8k
1 vote
Accepted

Does the daemon that mines a block see the transactions in clear text?

I went to #monero Slack channel, and received these answers: pigeons: … the destinations that the client sees are "encrypted" and not linkable to the monero receiving address you use endogenic: ...
dpzz's user avatar
  • 4,539

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